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Callum G. Brown 
The People of ›No Religion‹ 
The Demographics of Secularisation in the English-speaking World 
since c. 1900 
In the 1950s during her teenage years in England, a woman later recalled, she proclaimed 
in the school playground her non-belief in God, and for her breach of childhood rules 
was taunted by her classmates and called a »heathen«.1 The 1950s was a decade when 
there were varying degrees of difficulty almost everywhere in the western world for 
somebody to proclaim oneself as an atheist. It was especially difficult for a woman, upon 
whom high expectations were placed for setting a moral and religious standard which 
would lead, ultimately, to providing the headship, as mother and wife, for the respect-
ability and proper Christian upbringing of a family. In the sixty years since, there has been 
a remarkable change. The new-found freedom of the individual to proclaim an absence 
of religious belief and practice has been one of the greatest cultural changes which mark 
out our modern times. The extent to which the people of the West have become free from 
religion varies between nations and even within nations, sometimes enormously. But the 
trend is nonetheless widespread and very marked. 
Susan Budd ended her history of unbelief in England at 1960, at the very point when 
›no-religionism‹ started to explode in western culture.2 It is time to take the story forward, 
and to reflect on this massive alteration, and to transform the way we consider ›no religion‹ 
– from consideration of the minorities who have no faith, to analysis of the development 
of those who form the majorities in some nations of the early twenty-first century. In 2005, 
52 % of Europeans said they believed in God; but, as we shall see, even before 2000 a 
majority in some nations did not adhere to a religion.3 This article explores the social his-
tory of the rise of the people of ›no religion‹ in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, and 
the United States with additional evidence from Australia and New Zealand, mainly cov-
ering the period from 1950 to 2010 but with some additional review of available evi-
dence stretching back to 1900. After reflecting on the state of existing knowledge in the 
field, it will explore problems of definition. Using statistics, it will then make a quantita-
tive evaluation of the patterns of growth in the numbers of ›no-religionists‹ in the above 
countries, and then inquire more deeply into some demographic patterns observable from 
the data. The aim is to begin the construction of a narrative of the history of ›no religion‹. 
I. UNDERSTANDING ›NO-RELIGIONISM‹ 
Academic interest has been sluggish to grow in the rise of people without religious ad-
herence. The field has been dominated by two main tropes: first, atheists, deists and 
secularists as deviants, and second, the much more influential trope of secularisation as 
the decline of Christianity. Focus on ›no-religionism‹ per se has tended to be much less 
—————— 
1 Stef Pixner, The Oyster and the Shadow, in: Liz Heron (ed.), Truth Dare or Promise: Girls 
Growing Up in the Fifties, London 1985, pp. 79–102, here: p. 85. 
2 Susan Budd, Varieties of Unbelief: Atheists and Agnostics in English Society 1850–1960, Lon-
don 1977. 
3 European Commission, Social Values, Science and Technology: Special Eurobarometer 225 / 
Wave 63.1, 2005, p. 12. 
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well-developed, especially amongst historians. Amongst sociologists it has started to be-
come a more serious topic, though historical analysis has been largely absent.4 
The rise of people of ›no religion‹ has been most often dealt with in regard to ecclesias-
tical, political and social deviancy. Most of the historiography looks at the leading figures 
of secularism and atheism, those in secularist movements, those confronted by the law for 
the expression of non-religious views, and those who have been involved in high-profile 
controversy which elicited a public reaction. In such work, the focus is on the history of 
the development of organised ›no-religionism‹ – freethinking, secularism, and rationalism 
– and on the battles that have been fostered in relation to freedom of conscience of the in-
dividual, the separation of church and state, and the payment of church taxes. The strug-
gles for these rights have taken specific forms in different countries depending on the 
national constitution, the configuration of organised religion, and its relations with the na-
tional government. Indeed, it is the nature of these struggles, many of which have lasted 
from the late eighteenth century to the present, which have shaped and continue to shape 
the character of organised ›no-religionism‹ in each country. In this respect, there are par-
ticular histories to the development of the politics of ›no-religionism‹ – distinctive rela-
tionships between secularists and the state, shaped by distinctive constitutional and legal 
frameworks. 
The origins of modern atheism have been the subject of some significant studies. On 
the one hand there has been important research on the atheism and freethinking in the early-
modern world, whilst on the other research has pointed to the appeals the Enlightenment 
philosophers made to antiquity in search of a modern secularism, and the ability of An-
glicans to combine freethinking with support for the Church of England.5 From the late 
eighteenth century, a well-established literature describes how the Enlightenment threw 
up terms which became fixed in the European imagination: secularist, atheist, agnostic. 
From the 1790s to the 1870s, for the first time, movements of these groups came into 
being, the majority coalescing around radical and republican politics. The result is that 
freethinking from then on tends to be seen as a daring adjunct to the class struggle, its 
heroes, orators and organisers, those willing to be imprisoned for their beliefs (or lack of 
them). Thomas Paine, Charles Bradlaugh, and Robert G. Ingersoll are probably the three 
leading figures, cast up as the heroes of a long-term fight against organised religion. The 
British history of ›no religion‹ emphasises the heroes of free speech, freethinking, birth 
control and socialism. Edward Royle wrote two key books on the origins of British secu-
larism in the republicanism and radicalism emanating from Thomas Paine and Robert 
Owen from the 1790s through to the 1840s, and then through the influence of George 
Holyoake in the mid-Victorian decades and onto the foundation of the National Secular 
Society (1866), Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant in the 1880s, and the trials of George 
Foote in the 1910s. Royle argued that secularism was for a brief period a popular phi-
losophical system beside working-class socialism, rising in the face of Victorian Evan-
—————— 
4 See for instance: Barry A. Kosmin / Ariela Keysar, The American Nones. The Profile of the No 
Religion Population. A Report Based on the American Religious Identification Survey 2008, 
URL: <http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org> [11.1.2011]; Michael Hill / Zwaga Wiebe, 
The Nones’ Story. A Comparative Analysis of Religious Nonalignment, in: New Zealand Sociol-
ogy 4, 1989, pp. 164–189; Phil Zuckerman, Society without God: What the Least Religious Na-
tions Can Tell Us about Contentment, New York 2008. 
5 Michael Hunter, The Problem of ›Atheism‹ in Early Modern England, in: Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society (5th Series) 35, 1985, pp. 15–57; Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. The 
Rise of Modern Paganism, London 1995; Michael Graham, The Blasphemies of Thomas 
Aikenhead. Boundaries of Belief on the Eve of the Enlightenment, Edinburgh 2008; Sarah 
Ellenzweig, The Fringes of Belief: English Literature, Ancient Heresy, and the Politics of Free-
thinking, 1660–1760, Stanford, CA 2008. 
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gelicalism; »in the end«, he wrote, »secularisation made Secularism redundant«.6 He 
showed that as a membership movement it peaked in the 1850s, acting as a small sect of 
a few thousand.7 With Annie Besant in the 1880s, a strong gender dimension intruded, 
whereby freedom from religion became linked to feminism and freedom of control for 
women over their own bodies.8 Birth control symbolised a growing breach between con-
ventional Christianity and women’s freedom, and it was to be the human body that was 
to form an important theme in debates in the 1960s and after about the role of, intrusions 
by and defection from religion. 
The stories vary in important details between countries. In the United States, Robert 
G. Ingersoll stands far above the crowds as the dominant figure, a man of enormous fame 
for his oratory. Yet he is the object of some infighting within organised ›no-religionism‹ 
– between those who proclaim him as »the great agnostic« and those who proclaim him 
an atheist in all but name.9 The United States shows more clearly than most countries the 
divided nature of organised ›no-religionism‹ – organisations that have developed during 
the second half of the twentieth century into a community rather fractured partly by ideol-
ogy (some stressing atheism, some stressing humanism, some other variants) but much 
more by personality, organisational empires, money and scandal.10 Still, it is in the United 
States that organised ›no-religionism‹ has had the greatest legal successes in the twentieth 
century, not least aided by the constitutional separation of church and state and the ability 
of secularists to win court cases to keep religion out of schools, the judiciary and other 
areas of government activity.11 As we shall see, the US has the weakest ›no-religionism‹ 
of the nations under review, but it has the readiest legal platform for secularist work. 
The heroism of freethinkers and radicals is recounted by David Nash in a slightly dif-
ferent way, by approaching the issue through a study of blasphemy and the prosecution 
of secularist blasphemers. He uses this to show a longer (and still incomplete) strand of 
the story of ›no-religionism‹ stretching from Thomas Paine in the 1790s to the last person 
in Britain to go to gaol for blasphemy, J. W. Gott in 1921 (for comparing Christ to a circus 
clown), and through to the trial of Gay News magazine in 1977 (for publishing a poem 
which described the homosexual love felt by a centurion for the crucified Christ).12 Stress-
ing the concept of ›no religion‹ through the narrow dimension of blasphemy, this ap-
proach emphasises the issues of freedom of speech and thought, tending to shift attention 
—————— 
06 Edward Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Republicans: Popular Freethought in Britain 1866–
1915, Manchester 1980, p. 328. 
07 Idem, Victorian Infidels. The Origins of the British Secularist Movement 1791–1866, Manches-
ter 1974, pp. 287, 298 and 303. 
08 Besant also contributed to ›no-religionism‹ in the British Empire; Anne Taylor, Besant, Annie 
(1847–1933), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 2004, URL: <http://www.oxforddnb. 
com/view/article/30735> [3.1.2011]. 
09 On the contest between atheists, agnostics and humanists, see Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers. A 
History of American Secularism, New York 2004, pp. 149–185, and the somewhat unfavourable 
essay by one of the leading atheist figures, Madalyn Murray O’Hair, at URL: <http://www. 
atheists.org/Robert_G._Ingersoll> [25.6.2011]. 
10 This was nowhere more set in relief than by the disappearance and violent death in 1998 of the 
leading American atheist, Madalyn Murray O’Hair. For a sensationalist account, see Ann Rowe 
Seaman, America’s Most Hated Woman. The Life and Gruesome Death of Madalyn Murray 
O’Hair, New York 2006. 
11 The 1791 First Amendment to the US Constitution proclaimed: »Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof«. O’Hair was 
able to proudly claim thirty years after a court case in the 1960s: »There is no ›Lord’s Prayer‹ 
in the public schools of the United States because I, as an atheist, challenged it specifically«. 
Quoted in Bryan Le Beau, The Atheist: Madalyn Murray O’Hair, New York 2003, p. 305. 
12 David Nash, Blasphemy in Modern Britain, Aldershot 1999, pp. 189–190 and 239–256. 
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to the survival in the twentieth century of laws proscribing the individual’s ability to 
criticise Christianity, and illustrating the extent to which even in the twenty-first century 
the law in many countries sustains the possibilities of prosecution. From 1989, the blas-
phemy laws of Great Britain and Ireland, as of some European countries like Denmark, 
were brought to the fore again. This was partly through the challenge of Muslims seeking 
protection for Islam and the Prophet in particular from satirical or other treatment con-
sidered by them to be inappropriate.13 But in Ireland in 1999, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the law against blasphemy enshrined in the 1937 national constitution was unenforce-
able, and ten years later in 2009 the government introduced a new blasphemy law which 
defined an offence as »publishing or uttering matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in 
relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby intentionally causing outrage among 
a substantial number of adherents of that religion, with some defences permitted«.14 
Meanwhile in England and Wales in 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown abolished the 
crimes of blasphemy and blasphemous libel; in Scotland the offence was restated in 1825 
but the last prosecution was in 1843, and by now it is not considered as a crime; and 
though Canada has a blasphemous libel law modelled on an English original, it has been 
little used since the 1930s.15 For the ›no religion‹ movement, episodes such as that in Ire-
land were reminders that, notwithstanding the vast change to the religious culture of 
these countries in the last sixty years, religion in general, or a version of Christianity in 
particular, continued to enjoy positions which seemed privileged and unwarranted. 
Generally in these historical studies, there is an overlapping coverage of pretty much 
the same terrain using slightly different focuses: freethought, atheism, blasphemy, radi-
calism and the anti-censorship cause of libertines, gays and others. But throughout, the 
stress is on the struggle for human rights, one fought for by a minority of people. And 
concomitant with that is the idea that the beneficiaries of the struggles were also minori-
ties – and often a few individuals, unsupported by likeminded people because they could 
not find any who would express themselves. And even when, in the nineteenth century, 
there emerged larger groups of radicals of one kind or another willing to subscribe to 
freethought, secularism and /or atheism as part of wider struggles for the rights of democ-
racy, trade unions and working-class movements, the numbers who independently al-
lowed themselves to be considered (or to consider themselves) as ›no-religionists‹ of 
whatever hue were minuscule. Moreover, this issue of numbers is one that has taken a 
back seat in the historiography of atheism. Indeed, the issue has rarely been considered 
in open reflection in the standard histories of ›no-religionism‹; the demographics are dif-
ficult, admittedly, but they become rather side issues (even tackled as in Royle in appen-
dices). 
What is left largely unconsidered is a history of the popularity of ›no-religionism‹. 
The only way in which the concept of ›no religion‹ has entered historiography in any se-
rious and systematic way is through the study of secularisation, in which the wider demo-
graphics of ›no-religionism‹ have been studied almost entirely in terms of the decline of 
organised Christianity. Historians have traditionally approached secularisation by empha-
sising the evidence of the decline of Christian religion (mostly since the late nineteenth 
century): the decline of churchgoing, church membership, Christian rites de passage and 
ritual, Christian culture, and the decline of Christian thinking in intellectual affairs and 
—————— 
13 This was led in Britain by the Salman Rushdie affair; cf. Callum G. Brown, Religion and Society 
in Twentieth Century Britain, Harlow 2006, pp. 304–306. 
14 URL: <http://blasphemy.ie/why-campaign> [19.1.2011]. 
15 For England and Wales, see Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 29; for Scotland, see 
Gerald H. Gordon / Michael G. A. Christie, The Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol. 3, Edinburgh 
2001, p. 671, paragraph 41.28; for Canada, see Toronto Star, 6.7.2008, at URL: <http://www. 
thestar.com/comment/article/454787#article> [3.1.2011]. 
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affairs of state.16 Despite the existence of studies of rationalism and atheism, this narra-
tive of »loss« dominates, and reveals a religious-centric approach, whether implicit or 
explicit, which has rarely been challenged. The history of the rise of a society close to 
dominated by the idea of ›no religion‹ has hitherto been almost entirely approached as a 
negative – the decline of Christendom. 
So, this article seeks to take forward the study of the death of the dominant Christian 
culture in major English-speaking countries by approaching the subject from a ›positive‹ 
viewpoint. The rise of the people of ›no religion‹ is reaching a point of extraordinary 
breakthrough in Western Europe, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, has been at a high 
level for some time in Russia and some other nations of the former Communist bloc, and 
is showing signs of strong growth in many parts of the United States. What is occurring 
should not merely be understood as decline in Christianity or the collapse of Christen-
dom, as some scholars have called it. There is a positive story to tell. 
II. CONCEPTUALISING THE STUDY OF THE PEOPLE OF ›NO RELIGION‹ 
If we start trying to count ›no-religionists‹, who do we count and how do we categorise 
them? This may seem to be an unusually difficult problem, but it is no more difficult for 
scholarship than that of measuring religionists. There is indeed an equivalence in the dif-
ficulties, and one needs to resort to similar solutions. 
Before proceeding to consider the empirical pragmatics of beginning a social history of 
›no-religionism‹, it is important to offer some reflection on deeper issues. The social his-
tory of religion as a field of study is, to state the obvious, a field dominated by the central 
historical record of religion (in my own field, that of Christianity mainly). The study of 
secularisation has been almost wholly considered as a concept of the decline of religion; it 
is difficult to think of a work in this field, including all my own publications to date, that 
fail to take religion (or a part of it) and its decline as the starting point for study. Even 
when reflecting on postmodernism’s impact on secularisation studies, I have committed 
this assumption explicitly (though without self-awareness of wider ramifications). Having 
advised some years ago that secularisation was a narrative produced by Christianity in 
modernity, and that awareness of this was a product of the postmodern condition17, what is 
wholly omitted is the quite obvious – that secularisation can be viewed from the opposite 
perspective as the growth of a condition of ›no religion‹, comprising as part of it the theory 
and practice of ›no-religionism‹. The scholar of the social history of religion after 1960 
must of necessity be also a scholar of the social history of ›no religion‹. A narrative of ›no 
religion‹ needs to be composed, and dealt with as a positive part of the human condition. 
The fact that scholarship has not dealt with ›no religion‹ in this way before, and is now 
considering doing so, is a result of very recent changes. The growth of secularisation as a 
holistic concept in the social history of religion was a product of the western (and spe-
—————— 
16 Important examples include Hugh McLeod, Class and Religion in the Late Victorian City, Lon-
don 1974; Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, Cambridge 1976; Hugh McLeod, The Dechristianisation of the Working Class in Western 
Europe (1850–1900), in: Social Compass 27, 1980, pp. 191–214; idem (ed.), European Religion 
in the Age of Great Cities 1830–1930, London 1995; idem, Piety and Poverty: Working-class 
Religion in Berlin, London and New York 1870–1914, New York / London 1996; idem, Religion 
and the People of Western Europe 1789–1989, Oxford 1997; idem, Secularization in Western 
Europe 1848–1914, Basingstoke 2000; Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain. Un-
derstanding Secularisation 1800–2000, London 2001; Hugh McLeod / Werner Ustorf (eds.), 
The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750–2000, Cambridge 2003; Hugh McLeod, 
The Religious Crisis of the 1960s, Oxford 2007. 
17 Callum G. Brown, The Secularisation Decade: What the 1960s Have Done to the Study of Re-
ligious History, in: McLeod / Ustorf, The Decline of Christendom, pp. 29–46, here: p. 40. 
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cifically West European) society that fractured Christendom in and from the 1960s.18 It 
goes along with that that the rise of ›no religion‹ has been also a product of the same his-
torical change, and that historical scholarship is now contemplating ways of studying this 
as a positive development. This essay is about to demonstrate the quantitative evidence to 
underpin this claim to conceptual change: It will show that it was the 1960s that changed 
everything in the history of ›no religion‹. 
The shaping of a new field of study of the history of ›no religion‹ to stand alongside the 
study of the history of religion is a significant new enterprise. It involves not so much a 
paradigm shift as a paradigm inversion. As such, one will encounter the same pitfalls in 
concept, in categorisation, in statistical analysis, and in historical narration as the study 
of the history of religion. There is no difference in principle concerning the complexities. 
And those complexities are no more insuperable, and no more obstructive to the develop-
ment of the field of study, than they have been in the past to the social history of religion. 
Indeed, it is the development of complexity, and debate concerning them, that has enno-
bled the social history of religion. The same process can occur for ›no religion‹, and may 
even proceed at greater speed as a consequence of there having been (in the manner of 
Gerschenkron’s theory of industrialisation19) a pace-setter to copy – the experiences and 
successful problem-solving that occurred in the social history of religion. 
And the necessary starting point is to demonstrate the scale of the revolution that af-
flicted Christendom in the late twentieth century. For that ›no religion‹ revolution was 
underpinned by a discursive revolution that allowed both the people to conceive them-
selves as of ›no religion‹, and for the historian to come, belatedly, to see those people as 
a category for analysis – and not as mere deviants, nor embattled tiny minorities, nor as 
lapsed Christians or religious laggards, but as a vast demographic category in their own 
right. The discursive revolution which has allowed the phenomenon of ›no religion‹ to 
emerge is the same that allows scholarship to perceive it. 
To undertake that initial quantitative exercise, we must deploy the same techniques for 
solving conceptual problems that the social historian of religion uses in studying the 
people of religion. We start by acknowledging that there is no one measure of ›no religion‹. 
The religious can be discerned in churchgoers, church members, those baptised and doing 
the baptising, those who marry by religious rites, those who pay religious taxes, and those 
who read and absorb and genuflect to discursive frameworks of religion in their own self, 
their family and in their community (including the role of religion in civil government), 
and submit to religious rules (not always willingly) concerning proper and improper ap-
pearance, deportment, leisure and sexual activities. It has been important in the social his-
tory of religion to acknowledge how the way of establishing religiosity has changed in dif-
ferent cultures, and in different religions, and in different time periods. To take one simple 
example, for at least half a millennium European Christianity has tended to be a religion 
dominated by female practice (notably in churchgoing), giving it the reputation of being 
what the Victorians dubbed a ›Ladies‹ religion, whilst Islam and Judaism have been domi-
nated by male practice. To take a second example, churchgoing was more important to 
establish Christian credentials in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain than it was 
in the early-modern period or (it may be argued by some) in the later twentieth century.20 
In such ways, the social history of religion has had to acknowledge the shifting sands of 
what ›a Christian‹ has been, and to question any notion of there being an acceptable prac-
tice (in scholarship) of trying to decide who might be ›a true Christian‹ and who not. 
—————— 
18 Clearly, the term has longer provenance, but it was more conceptually confined than it became 
from the 1960s. See ibid., p. 35. 
19 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, MA 1962. 
20 On this subject, see Margaret Spufford, Can We Count the ›Godly‹ and the ›Conformable‹ in 
the Seventeenth Century?, in: Journal of Ecclesiastical History 36,1985, pp. 428–438. 
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The same applies for those of ›no religion‹. There is no difference in principle in doing 
this, but merely an adept reversal of the perspective (from religion to ›no religion‹). The 
people of ›no religion‹ may be classified as one or more of: negatively the non-church-
goer, the non-church adherent, the avoider of religious ritual, and the religiously indifferent 
(a very large category, and one which will constitute the greatest problem for scholarship); 
positively amongst those who perceive their political, moral and personal identity to be 
evidenced in particular choices of occupation, commitment (ideological generally, ranging 
from feminism, socialism, human rights and eco-activities to a wider humanitarianism), 
in forms of domesticity, lifestyle, or everyday activity; and positively, in intellectual 
fashion, as the avower (to varying degrees and by varying methods) of atheism, agnosti-
cism, freethought, secularism, humanism, scepticism, rationalism, and other possible in-
tellectual positions. The ›no-religionist‹ appears as a construct of one or some of these, 
the possible combinations being numerous and in need of more exploration than there is 
space for here. The defining of the people of ›no religion‹ will remain a constant work in 
progress, and the above should not be regarded as closed categories, and should always 
be seen as over-lapping. And, as with the religionist, there is no moral (or scholarly) virtue 
in trying to establish what qualities constitute the ›true no-religionist‹; there is no fixed 
certainty to this, no single ›test‹ of ›no religion‹. 
The quantitative exercise, therefore, must approach ›no-religionists‹ with some of the 
same types of decision. Where the social historian of religion accepts measures, for ex-
ample, of the numbers of churchgoers and church adherents as in themselves significant 
indicators of Christian identity (and offering different histories21), so the social historian 
of ›no religion‹ needs to accept numbers of non-churchgoers and non-church adherents 
as significant indicators of religious alienation. These are important categories but are not 
the only ones: rates of religious solemnisation of marriage, baptism, confirmation and first 
communion often display different trajectories, whilst opinion poll questions about church 
attendance and belief display different again. Indeed, the basis of the social historian’s 
work with statistics is to accept that there is no single countable category of religiosity, 
but several which offer discrete indicators of Christianity’s fortunes. Where those indica-
tors tend to fall together, as they did in most of Europe, North America and Australasia 
in the 1960s, this can usually be taken as good evidence of a general decline in the social 
significance of religion. Where that decline is sustained, as it was in most of Europe and 
Canada (but not so much the USA) for fifty years after the 1960s, this may be taken as 
reliable evidence of a comprehensive decline (and perhaps collapse) of Christendom. 
Reversing the perspective, in these processes is to be found evidence of the growth and 
maturing of ›no-religionism‹. 
The historian hoping to discern an identifiable ›core‹ to ›no-religionism‹ that can equate 
to a core of religionism should be restrained. The idea that a core ›faith‹ (Christian or Is-
lamic for instance) can be ›matched‹ by a core ›unbelief‹ may flounder if tests are put up 
for an absence. Clearly, unbelief can be at the heart of somebody’s ›no-religionism‹, but 
equally it may not be; ›no-religionism‹ can be the product of non-speculative atheism22 – 
that is an absence of reflection on the issue of belief in a god. In this regard, we should 
be quite open about the multiplicity of sub-categories that can be enveloped in ›no-re-
ligionism‹. Whether ›no-religionism‹ existed in all cultures is also an important question; 
there may be a case for arguing that in early-modern England atheists were rarely ›no-
religionists‹.23 These issues will need thought and to be researched through. 
—————— 
21 For reflection on such complexities, see Brown, The Secularisation Decade, pp. 41–43. 
22 A term developed in David Berman, A History of Atheism in Britain: From Hobbes to Russell, 
London 1988, pp. 1–43. 
23 Cf. Ellenzweig, The Fringes of Belief. 
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As we approach the task of enumerating ›no religion‹, we confront immediately not 
merely the issue of multiple indicators (as with religion), but the twin problems that (a) 
most of these indicators tend to be negatives of religion, and that (b) most are expressions 
of belief given to enumerators (either in writing or in person) and not counts of actions 
(as with for example churchgoers). There is, broadly, no equivalent of going to church for 
the non-believer; membership and attendance at meetings of ›no religion‹ groups (such 
as the British Humanist Association, American Atheists, or the international »Center for 
Inquiry«), are very small compared to population, and rarely an equivalent to religious 
worship. Recourse to humanist and atheist marriages, baby-naming and funerals offers 
alternative activity-centred measures, but the popularity of these is regionally highly var-
ied within high-secularising nations: high in Scotland (where humanist weddings were 
state recognised in 2005), moderate in England and Wales (where they are not), and neg-
ligible in Canada (even where they are recognised in Ontario). Non-religious ritual, cer-
tainly within Europe, North America and Australasia, and probably in the world, is at its 
highest in Scotland, a country of the United Kingdom with autonomy over law concerning 
the main life rituals.24 In this regard, Table 1 shows the dramatic growth of these rituals 
in that country in the early twenty-first century, reaching minimum figures of 11.4 % of 
all non-state weddings and 5.4 % of funerals in 2009. However, as the table also indicates, 
these figures do not so far match the spectacular scale, or growth, of ›no-religionism‹ in 
the Scots population at large – which rose from 27.6 % in 2001 to 40 % in 2008. No other 
country can yet match these figures across the range from ritual to adherence. It seems 
likely that ›no-religionist‹ ritual will grow significantly in coming decades (the trends are 
currently upwards in every western nation that measures it), but except in Scotland they 
are not yet numerically sufficiently significant for major research analysis. 
Table 1: ›No-Religionism‹ at its Ritual Peak: Humanist rites de passage in Scotland 
2000–2009 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
% Scots ›no religion‹  27.6 30 31 31 33 35 39 40  
Humanist Society 
members 423 507 570 634 682 1114 2121 2682 4040 5757 
Humanist weddings 
(as % of all non-state 
marriages) 
53 
(0.3) 
71
(0.4) 
110
(0.6) 
86
(0.5) 
80
(0.5) 
116
(0.8) 
443
(3.0) 
710
(4.9) 
1025 
(7.5) 
1515 
(11.4) 
Humanist baby naming 
(as % of births) 
16 
(0.0) 
23
(0.0) 
30
(0.1) 
49
(0.1) 
46
(0.1) 
61
(0.1) 
81
(0.1) 
 105 
(0.2) 
128 
(0.2) 
Humanist funerals 
(as % of deaths) 
325 
(0.6) 
507
(0.9) 
734
(1.3) 
1059
(1.8) 
1387
(2.5) 
1666
(3.0) 
1862
(3.4) 
 2533 
(4.5) 
2883 
(5.4) 
Note: ›No religion‹ figure for 2001 from census, 2002–2008 from Scottish Household Survey. Hu-
manist weddings until 2005 were unrecognised by the state (and thus required a supplementary state 
wedding). Figures for humanist ceremonies are minimum figures, as independent humanists also 
operate in several parts of Scotland.25 
—————— 
24 This autonomy predates the formation of the Scottish parliament in 1998, and was and remains 
administratively held by the Registrar General for Scotland under legislation stretching back to 
1855. 
25 Sources: Membership and Ceremonies Data, Humanist Society of Scotland Annual Reports 
2000–2010; Scottish Household Survey, Private Communication; GRO Scotland Vital Events 
Reference Tables 2009, Tables 3.2, 5.3 and 7.7, URL: <http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/ 
statistics/theme/vital-events/general/ref-tables/index.html> [4.1.2011]. 
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There are some indicators of ›no-religionism‹ that are not negatives, but almost invariably 
poor indicators. For instance, the numbers of atheists, agnostics and humanists are counted 
in some countries when they are ›written in‹ on census forms, but because these are gen-
erally not offered as printed categories on those forms they are less likely to attain their 
full representation. In any event, the numbers of these are small. For instance, in the cen-
sus of England and Wales in 2001, out of a population of 52 million, there were, as self-
described written-in categories, 14,909 agnostics, 10,357 atheists, 8,297 humanists, 278 
heathens, 37 rationalists, and 11 secularists; contrast these figures with the category of 
›no religion‹ offered on the census form, which was ticked by 7,274,290 people.26 Simi-
larly, in the census of Ireland in 2006, out of a population of 4,239,848, there were 1,515 
agnostics and 929 atheists, but 186,318 people of ›no religion‹.27 With atheists barely 
reaching 0.02 % of population in either of these countries, it is clear that this is a poor 
measure of ›no religion‹, whilst the more popular category »agnostic« is open to wide 
interpretation.28 This makes measures of atheism and agnosticism quite problematic. 
Certainly, the proportions of atheists in the population are significantly smaller in census 
returns to questions when set in the context of religious affiliation (i. e. do you belong to 
a church / religious denomination?) rather than when set in the context of belief or not in 
God; for example for Britain, atheists enumerated in belief-based questionnaires achieve 
results of 39 to 44 %, compared to 0.2 % in the affiliation-based questionnaire of the 
2001 census.29 Phil Zuckerman estimated from a survey of secondary literature that be-
tween 500 million and 750 million people in the 2000s did not believe in God;30 expressed 
in proportional terms, this represented between 7.3 and 10.9 % of the planetary popula-
tion. 
However, the collection of such data has been extremely poor in historical terms: The 
questions have not been asked in any geographical detail (for sub-territories of coun-
tries), have rarely been asked at regular intervals over the twentieth century, and the 
sample sizes have often been quite small (or are now indeterminate). The manner of an-
swering questions on religion is also problematic. Before the later twentieth century, there 
were often pressures from employers, landlords, work colleagues and family to be faced 
in describing one’s religious adherence, and, for an atheist, as we have seen, it could be 
an offence in Britain, Ireland or Canada to deny the existence of God. This meant that the 
freedom to be honest might be restricted, and even now, it has been argued by American 
sociologists, it is socially harder to ›come out‹ as an atheist in the USA than as a commu-
nist.31 With the additional problems of definition, the high degree of questionnaire varia-
tion depending on wordage, the variation in answers from form-based to face-to-face in-
—————— 
26 Table-2-2, written-in answers, 2001 census, URL: <http://www.brin.ac.uk> [4.1.2011]. 
27 Irish Census 2006, Vol. 13: Religion, URL: <http://beyond2020.cso.ie/census/ReportFolders/ 
ReportFolders.aspxaccessed> [30.1.2009]. 
28 I have interviewed 57 humanists and members of other non-religious groups, and around one 
third describe themselves as »agnostic«, and explain this to mean a principled position (where 
they take atheism to be scientifically unjustified, and agnosticism the logical position on the 
existence of God). However, many English-speaking people take »agnostic« to signify indeci-
sion on the question, thus generating considerable divergence in meaning. 
29 The figure 39 % comes from Pippa Norris / Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and 
Politics Worldwide, New York 2004, 44 % from a BBC survey »What the World Thinks about 
God«, Broadcast BBC2 tv, 26.2.2004. 
30 Phil Zuckerman, Atheism: Contemporary Rate and Patterns, in: Michael Martin (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Atheism, Cambridge 2007, URL: <http://atheism.110mb.com> 
[4.1.2011]. 
31 Penny Edgell / Joseph Gerteis / Douglas Hartmann, Atheists as ›Other‹: Moral Boundaries and 
Cultural Membership in American Society, in: American Sociological Review 71, 2006, No. 2, 
pp. 211–234. 
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terviews32, and the general incomparability of data across nations and (with a few excep-
tions) across time periods, this leaves measures of atheism and associated descriptors as 
poor tools for the historian of ›no religion‹. 
This makes the categorisation of ›no religion‹ itself as an important, arguably the best, 
initial statistical device in this field. Its merits are that it is a category included in virtually 
all government censuses of religious affiliation, it is offered as a ›box category‹ for ticking 
on forms and in instructions to enumerators, has applied from its earliest national usage 
(in Canada) in 1871 to the present, has been set in an affiliation context rather than the 
very problematic belief-based context, and has generally had relatively unchanging man-
ners of collection and computation. In Canada, for instance, the instruction to enumerators 
in 2001 was: »for persons who have no connection or affiliation with any religious group 
or denomination, mark ›no religion‹. Report ›atheist‹ or ›agnostic‹ if applicable«.33 There 
were only three significant problems. First, in all countries, including Canada and Ireland, 
the issue arises whether answering the religion question was compulsory or voluntary, and 
secondly what extent of latitude was permitted for »not stated« to be entered as an alter-
native (as this was a significantly variable number across the decades, and could bear 
strongly on interpreting numbers entering ›no religion‹). These first two issues actually 
offer some interpretational opportunities, for »not stated« in some countries (like Canada) 
was actually inflated in certain censuses, indicating important trends. But the third issue 
is more significant. What did a person mean when responding ›no religion‹? This might 
be interpreted as varying between, at the one extreme, the principled ›no-religionist‹ (en-
couraged, for instance, by campaigns by humanist and atheist groups to get secularists to 
stand up to be counted at censuses as part of a challenge to religious power34), to the re-
ligiously indifferent person who, with no affiliation to a church in his or her adulthood, 
may enter ›no religion‹ to mean ›no church‹. This latter problem has been highlighted in 
the 2001 UK censuses, as there were three differently-worded forms: In England and 
Wales respondents were offered ›no religion‹ beside names of religions (i. e. Christian, 
Muslim, Judaism), whilst in Scotland and Northern Ireland the format used was that his-
torically adopted in Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand – namely, of offering 
›no religion‹ beside church names (Church of Scotland, Roman Catholic Church, Other 
Christian, as well as names of the minority religions). The difference is thought in Eng-
land and Wales to have tended to inflate those responding ›Christian‹ (in contrast to those 
answering one of the Christian churches in Scotland), thereby causing an underscore for 
›no religion‹ in England and Wales compared to other countries. With the difference in 
manner of question to be broadly repeated in the 2011 census, there is no way at present 
of bringing England and Wales into line with the results of other countries. 
There is another problem. In some nations, having a religion is almost a civic neces-
sity. This applies notably in some of the otherwise most secular nations in the world, in-
cluding Scandinavian ones, where the payment of church taxes has traditionaly ensured 
access to rituals such as the social conventions of church marriage and church funeral. 
This helps to explain some of the results of recent sociologists’ analysis of ›no religion‹. 
Andrew Greeley analysed data from the International Social Survey Programme to assess 
—————— 
32 One researcher, Geoffrey Gorer, pointed to variations in claimed ›no religion‹ in England by 
manner of survey: face-to-face interviews in two polls of 1947 and 1950 gave figures of 8 and 
9 % respectively, a form-based survey he undertook himself in 1954 gave 22 %, whilst an in-
terview-based one he did in 1965 gave 9 and 4 % for men and women respectively; Geoffrey 
Gorer, Death, Grief, and Mourning in Contemporary Britain, London 1965, pp. 161 f.; Brown, 
Religion and Society, pp. 182–187. 
33 Statistics Canada, Census Guide [for enumerators], Ottawa 2001, question 22, p. 10. 
34 Such a campaign was run in 2011 in UK by humanist groups; Juliet Wilson, If You Are Not 
Religious for God’s Sake Say So!, Humanitae Winter 2010 / 11, p. 5. 
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change in ›no religion‹ between 1991 and 1998 in 24 European countries; he found that 
in only three countries, Austria, Northern Ireland and Italy, had there not been a statistically 
significant increase, whilst the greatest change was in Hungary, Slovenia, Britain and Ire-
land. But the absolute strength of ›no religion‹ by 1998 was highest in former East Ger-
many (68 %), Netherlands (58 %), France (47 %), Britain and the Czech Republic (both 
45 %), lowest in Cyprus (0 %), Ireland and Poland (both 6 %), Portugal (8 %) and Swit-
zerland (9 %), with a European average of 23 %. This left, in the middle ground, other-
wise highly secularised nations with lower-than-expected levels of religious affiliation – 
Sweden (29 %), former West Germany (15 %), Denmark (12 %), and Norway (10 %).35 
This shows that ›no religion‹, like every other category, has country-specific connotations 
which make an absolute measurement of religious alienation maybe impossible. 
The issues raised in the last two paragraphs are important, but are far less fatal to 
scholarship than the issues surrounding the notoriously-problematic use of religious sta-
tistics. Indeed, there is much greater simplicity in using ›no religion‹ since it is a category 
that did not change within nations as a result of church union and schism, and, more im-
portantly, did not change as a result of (a) variation in the strictness of application of cri-
teria of church membership and (b) changes in the definition of communicants.36 When 
used in single-country analysis, ›no religion‹ offers for the historian of statistics some-
thing sublimely simple and with a conceptual wholeness; ticking its box marks an un-
equivocal distance from belonging, membership or participation in religious rites and 
churches. Despite its negativity, its use by individuals in the midst of societies dominated 
by religious adherence, practice and (usually) civil law (as, broadly, virtually all but for-
mer communist countries were in the twentieth century) is an act of some commitment, a 
statement of nonconformity, of positive choice, and a breaking of the discursive frame-
work. It surely incorporates for many people an act of intellectual defiance of the hege-
monic norm – that of religious belonging. In most cases until very recently (until the 
1990s at least), the person ticking ›no religion‹ was breaking the tradition of the family, 
inscribing the first breach in the religious continuity between generation and generation 
going back centuries – a breach in what the French scholar Danièle Hervieu-Léger called 
the »chain of memory« of religion (a concept wholeheartedly adopted and expanded upon 
by English sociologist Grace Davie).37 Here is the commitment to the new, a statement of 
individualism, a form of what Bernice Martin once called »the expressive revolution«.38 
By filling in the decennial census form, the individual is confronting the government and 
its official form, answering questions on the household’s occupants, their ages, occupa-
tions and other empirical ›objective‹ demographic data. In the midst of this the house-
holder is asked to tick his / her own religious preference, that of other adults in the house-
hold, and the religion in which children are or are likely to be raised. With all the popu-
lation covered (or a 20 % sample as in Canada’s post-1980 censuses), there is an official 
quality to the census answer that the opinion pollster cannot match on the street corner or 
in the telephone inquiry. The historian should treat that tick with great seriousness. 
—————— 
35 Andrew M. Greeley, Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium. A Sociological 
Profile, New Brunswick 2003, pp. 55 f. 
36 The best example of the latter practice occurred between the 1950s and 1970s when the Church 
of England gradually replaced the measurement of Easter Day communicants with the measure-
ment of Easter Week communicants (the latter producing a higher figure). See the graph of both 
measures in Brown, The Death of Christian Britain, p. 164. 
37 A concept in which both scholars float the possibility of religion surviving the institutional 
collapse of Christianity by being embedded in the memory of European individuals; Danièle 
Hervieu-Léger, Religion as a Chain of Memory, Cambridge 2000; Grace Davie, Religion in 
Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates, Oxford 2000. 
38 Bernice Martin, A Sociology of Contemporary Cultural Change, Oxford 1981. 
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III. THE GROWTH OF ›NO RELIGION‹: CENSUS MEASURES 
In Canada, where the people were first asked at a census in 1871, there were 5,198 out of 
3,689,257 people (a mere 0.14 %) who stated ›no religion‹ to the enumerators.39 Since then, 
other countries have come to ask the same sort of question. Mainland Britain had no offi-
cial state census of religious belonging until 2001; only in Northern Ireland and in Ireland 
(both before and after partition in 1922) did censuses record the numbers of non-believers. 
Australia starting asking the question from 1906, New Zealand from at least 1951, and the 
United States did not ask for the numbers of non-religious in official censuses, though it did 
undertake a sample survey in 1957 which did record ›no religion‹. So, the category has ac-
tually a long statistical heritage. However, the category has had to suffer some existence in 
a nether world; in Ireland the ›no-religionists‹ were lumped in with »not stated« until 1961 
(and are thus inseparable in published census data), and in other regards as a category it has 
not been studied to any significant degree in any country until comparatively recently. 
But with the emergence of the category, what can be discerned of the progress and 
character of ›no-religionism‹? 
Canada 
The Canadian census recorded the religious affiliation of the population (in later years 
by 20 % sampling), and the category ›no religion‹ has been offered at each census since 
1871 (though in 1891 it was not separately recorded). The results are given in Figure 1. 
Several remarkable features are noteworthy. 
Figure 1: ›No Religion‹ in Canada 1871–2001: Proportion of Population at Decennial 
Censusus 
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Note: The graphline shows the percentage of the people indicating ›no religion‹ (or for 2001 ›no 
religious affiliation‹). The category was not separately measured in 1891.40 
—————— 
39 Statistics Canada, online data, Series A164-184: Principal religious denominations of the popu-
lation, census dates, 1871 to 1971, URL: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca> [24.11.2009]. 
40 Sources: Statistics Canada Table 075-0016 CANSIM (database), URL: <http://cansim2.statcan. 
gc.ca/cgi-wein/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&CNSM-Fi=CII/CII_1-eng.htm> [13.11.2009]; and URL:  
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First, the proportion of ›no religion‹ is tiny until the later twentieth century. Until the 1971 
census, the numbers are so small (barely breaking 0.5 % in 1961) that these data add 
considerable weight to the idea that a proclamation of ›no religion‹ was unacceptable to 
almost the entire population – including, arguably, for reasons of social acceptance as 
much as individual belief. Only in 1991 does the proportion begin to exceed 10 %. 
Second, in many census years there was a reduction in not just the proportion of peo-
ple, but the number of people enumerating themselves as ›no religion‹. Between 1911 and 
1941 there were three decades of declining numbers, despite rapidly rising population. 
This may in part reflect the growing organisation of the churches and their improved 
coverage in both urban and rural districts of Canada, through which they spread not only 
active membership but also passive identity amongst the less committed. Notwithstanding 
this, the trend towards decreased non-religious identity would suggest very strongly that 
there was no progressive, gradualist growth in non-religiosity in the first half of the twen-
tieth century. Indeed the reverse seems to be the case. Fewer and fewer people were will-
ing to classify themselves as without a church to which they ›belonged‹, and the numbers 
so doing fell from a high of 87,000 in 1881 to a low of 17,000 in 1941. This point is em-
phasised when considering the category »religious denomination not stated« – those fail-
ing to respond to the census question. (This figure was recorded from 1871 to 1941, but 
from 1951 it was no longer ›allowed‹ by census enumerators who were under strict in-
structions to obtain a response.41) When given the option of not responding to the ques-
tion of religious adherence, the people in the Canadian census were being asked specifi-
cally if they were not adherents of a denomination (or church). Thus, the numbers re-
sponding negatively in this way were at the minimum making a statement of indecision 
about adherence. In this regard, it is noteworthy how from a high point of 87,000 in 1881, 
the numbers fall continuously and substantially to 16,042 in 1931, and then only rise mar-
ginally to 17,459 in 1941. This would suggest a decreasing number unable or unwilling 
to align themselves with a denomination. This enhances the argument that an articulated 
non-religiosity was diminishing in the first half of the twentieth century, tending to sup-
port the refutation of the hypothesis of gradualist secularisation. 
Third, the 1960s were the breakthrough years for ›no religion‹ in Canada. There was a 
734 % increase in the proportion claiming that status between 1961 and 1971, and a ten-
fold leap in the numbers from 95,000 to 930,000 people. The numbers then close to dou-
bled in the 1970s and again in the 1980s, though proportionately the growth rate was 
slightly less. This conclusion is given extra weight when analysing the data for those not ex-
pressing a religious affiliation in this graph – which is a larger group than ›no-religionists‹, 
for it included the »not stated« group that started to rise from the 1960s. 
Fourth, perhaps surprisingly, the growth rate in the proportion reporting ›no religion‹ 
fell in the 1990s compared to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s; the rate of growth was half 
that of the previous two decades. But there are various indicators that numbers have risen 
again in the 2000s. 
—————— 
<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/RetrieveProductTable. 
cfm?Temporal=2001&PID=55821&APATH=3&METH=1&PTYPE=55440&THEME=56& 
FOCUS=0&AID=0&PLACENAME=0&PROVINCE=0&SEARCH=0&GC=9&GK=NA& 
VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=&FL=0&RL=0&FREE=0&GID=431515> [25.11.2009]. 
41 In the 1991 Census Handbook, Statistics Canada reported the following as the instruction to 
enumerators: »Question 17 Religion: What is this person’s religion? Indicate a specific denomi-
nation or religion even if this person is not currently a practising member of that group. For ex-
ample, Roman Catholic, Ukrainian Catholic, United Church, Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran, 
Baptist, Pentecostal, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Mennonite, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Salvation 
Army, Islam, Buddhist, Hindu, Sikh«. Note the absence of ›no religion‹ options from these sug-
gestions; Statistics Canada, 1991 Census Handbook, Ottawa 1991, p. 51. 
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Figure 2: ›No Religion‹ in Canada 1951–2001: By Province and Territory 
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Note: The bar chart shows the proportion of the people indicating ›no religion‹ (or for 2001 ›no reli-
gious affiliation‹) for each province and territory. For 2001, North West Territory includes the ter-
ritory of Nunavet created in 1999.42 
The growth of ›no religion‹ has not been geographically even across Canada. Figure 2 is 
a barchart displaying the rate of change over the period 1951–2001 by province and ter-
ritory. This shows that the greatest growth of ›no religion‹ responses at censuses was in 
the western areas of Canada in Yukon, British Columbia and Alberta. A second tier of 
provinces with mid-level growth emerged mostly in central Canada – Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Ontario and North West Territories. By comparison, the eastern and maritime 
provinces showed comparatively low levels of ›no religion‹ responses, even in 2001 – 
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and, lowest of all, New-
foundland and Labrador. This west-to-east ordering appears to over-ride the economic and 
metropolitan order of provinces, which tend to start with Ontario and Quebec. However, 
the low level of stated ›no religion‹ in Quebec needs to be treated with special caution. 
There is now a wide acceptance of the concept of the »quiet revolution« that unfolded in 
that province in the 1970s, and which afflicted the popularity of Catholicism in very stark 
ways.43 The result is seen to be a very major transition from a province with a strong 
Catholic heritage to one which had witnessed not merely a weakening in the popular 
place of the Catholic Church, but a broader secularisation. So, it is wise not to accept data 
such as these as the last word on the rate and geography of dechristianisation. 
—————— 
42 Sources: Statistics Canada Table 075-0016 CANSIM (database), URL: <http://cansim2.statcan. 
gc.ca/cgi-wein/cnsmcgi.exe?Lang=E&CNSM-Fi=CII/CII_1-eng.htm> [13.11.2009]; and URL: 
<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/RetrieveProductTable. 
cfm?Temporal=2001&PID=55821&APATH=3&METH=1&PTYPE=55440&THEME=56& 
FOCUS=0&AID=0&PLACENAME=0&PROVINCE=0&SEARCH=0&GC=99&GK=NA& 
VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=&FL=0&RL=0&FREE=0&GID=431515> [25.11.2009]. 
43 Michael Gauvreau, The Catholic Origins of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, 1931–1970, Montreal 
2005; see also Thomas Sloan, Quebec: The Not-so Quiet Revolution, Toronto 1965. 
The Demographics of Secularisation in the English-speaking World since c. 1900 51 
Figure 3: Protestant and Roman Catholic Adherents in Canada 1871–2001: 
As Percentage of Population 
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Note: Each graphline displays the proportion of total population identifying as belonging to the 
Roman Catholic Church, or to a principal Protestant church (Anglican, Baptist, Congregationalist, 
Evangelical Church, Lutheran, Mennonite, Methodist, Pentecostalist, Presbyterian, Salvation Army 
and United Church of Canada).44 
Finally from Canada, Figure 3 indicates something of the denominational sources of the 
rise of ›no religion‹. The trend was set by the decline in adherence to Protestantism, and 
notably from the United Church of Canada (UCC). In the middle decades of the century 
Catholicism was becoming more influential as a result of the patterns of immigration, 
but from 1981 the Catholic proportion of the population was also declining. This supports 
evidence from Europe that dechristianisation started in the 1950s and 1960s in Protes-
tantism and then spread in the 1970s and 1980s to Catholicism. 
The rise in the proportion of ›no-religionists‹ coincided after 1965 with the near evis-
ceration of Christianity in Canada, incorporating the collapse of Christian institutions, 
practice and culture. In 1946 weekly church attendance in Canada was 67 % of popula-
tion, and in 1965 still stood at 55 %. But by 1985 the figure had fallen to 35 % and by 
2001 to 20 %.45 This stands surely as one of the most dramatic changes in popular reli-
gious practice ever seen in any nation. It has aroused extensive debate in church circles, 
especially viewed from the previous convention that Canada followed a religious destiny 
broadly linked to that of the United States.46 
—————— 
44 Sources: Figures calculated from data from Statistics Canada: for 1871–1971, Table 075-0016 
CANSIM database [13.11.2009]; for 2001: Religion and Sex for Canada [14.11.2009]; 1981 
Census of Canada: Population: Religion (Ottawa 1983); Census 1991: Religions in Canada: 
The Nation (Ottawa 1993), table 1, pp. 6–17. 
45 Figures cited in Nancy Christie / Michael Gauvreau, Secularisation or Resacralisation? The Ca-
nadian Case, 1760–2000, in: Callum G. Brown / Michael Snape (eds.), Secularisation in the 
Christian World. Essays in Honour of Hugh McLeod, Farnham 2010, pp. 93–117. 
46 Mark A. Noll, What Happened to Christian Canada?, Vancouver 2007. 
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Figure 4: ›No Religion‹ in Australia 1906–2006: Proportion of Population at Censuses 
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Note: The graphline shows the percentage of the people indicating ›no religion‹. The data points on 
the x axis are irregularly spaced.47 
Figure 5: ›No Religion‹ in New Zealand 1951–2006: Proportion of Population at 
Censuses48 
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—————— 
47 Source: Yearbook Australia 2006, Table 12.26, URL: <http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au> 
[6.12.2009]. 
48 Sources: Data for 1951–1981 from Michael Hill / Wiebe Zwaga, Religion in New Zealand: 
Change and Comparison, in: James A. Beckford / Thomas Luckmann (eds.), The Changing Face 
of Religion, London 1989, p. 72; data for 1991–2006 from New Zealand Census of Population 
and Dwellings, 2001, table 16 (1), and 2006, religious affiliation (1), URL: <http://www.stats. 
govt.nz> [25.6.2011]. 
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Australia and New Zealand 
Figures 4 and 5 show the proportions of people responding ›no religion‹ in Australasia. 
The first of these indicates the levels since 1906 in Australia. It shows a remarkably 
similar scale and developmental history to that of Canada. First, the proportion is under 
0.6 % until the mid-1960s. Second, the proportion actually falls after 1921 and does not 
recover until the 1960s, indicating how there was no gradualist growth in this indicator 
of secularisation. Third, the proportion starts to rise in the early 1960s, doubling from 0.4 
to 0.8 % between 1961 and 1966, but then grows by more than 800 % in five years to 
6.7 % in 1971. Fourth, the growth rate then slows but stays at a high level, to 18.7 % in 
2006. In each of these four features, Australia replicates extremely closely the Canadian 
pattern and, most importantly, demonstrates the key place of the 1960s in the emergence 
of ›no-religionists‹. 
The New Zealand data in Figure 5 tend to confirm the pattern. The dataset shows a 
level of ›no-religionism‹ at 0.8 and 0.9 % in 1951 and 1961 respectively, and then the 
characteristic breakthrough in the 1960s – in this case of more than 300 % in a decade. 
The 1980s seem to show a dramatic change from 6.4 to 20.2 %, and a sustained climb to 
31.1 % in 2006. New Zealand has a very high level of ›no-religionism‹, and would bear 
close examination of the reasons. 
Figure 6: ›No Religion‹ in Ireland 1961–2006: Percentage at Censuses 
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Note: The figures for 2002 and 2006 include the small numbers of atheists and agnostics as ›written-
in‹ answers (the results for which were published for the first time for those years).49 
—————— 
49 Sources: Irish censuses 1926–1991, URL: <www.cso.ie/census_26> etc. [27.11.2009]; Census 
2006, Vol. 13: Religion, URL: <http://beyond2020.cso.ie/census/ReportFolders/ReportFolders. 
aspx> [30.11.2009]; for 2002 see URL: <http://beyond2020.cso.ie/Census/TableViewer/table 
View.aspx> [30.11.2009]. 
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Ireland 
Figure 6 shows that the figures for ›no religion‹ have been much lower in Ireland than in 
all of the other countries studied, and remain very small to the present time. However, 
the gradient of change follows a familiar curve. 
In Ireland, the number of ›no-religionists‹ were counted and published from 1961; be-
fore then, the non-religious were counted with »not stated«. The proportion of ›no religion‹ 
was minuscule (0.04 %) in 1961, and even in 2002 the proportion (3.6 %) was lower than 
it had been in Canada in 1971. By 2006 it had reached 4.5 %, which suggests a point at 
which other countries being reviewed reached during or by the end of the 1960s. Never-
theless, the numbers of ›no-religionists‹ rose sevenfold in Ireland in the 1960s and in the 
decade following, in a way that they could not have done before, suggesting that though 
the scale of ›no-religionism‹ was on a much reduced scale it still felt the winds of change 
of that decade. Notwithstanding the substantial growth rate, Ireland was a society in which 
Christian identity and practice were extremely strong down to the early twenty-first cen-
tury; in terms of the North Atlantic community, it was a community with the lowest level 
of ›no religion‹. It represents a model of a strong Christian culture in both popular and 
civic life matched by only a few places in the Europeanised world – notably in Northern 
Ireland (of which more in a moment) and the Balkans. 
Figure 7: ›No Religion‹ in USA 1957–2008: Proportion at Phone Polls 
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Note: Percentage responding ›no religion‹ in comparable surveys of ca. 50,000 people (telephone 
sampling). The one in 1957 was commissioned by the US Bureau of the Census.50 
—————— 
50 Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1968, table 49, p. 41; Barry A. Kosmin / Egon 
Mayer / Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey (City University of New York), 
URL: <http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_briefs/aris.pdf> [19.11.2009], Exhibit 15, pp. 
39–42; Barry A. Kosmin / Ariela Keysar, The American Nones: The Profile of the No Religion 
Population: A Report Based on the American Religious Identification Survey 2008, URL: 
<www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org> [11.1.2011]. 
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United States 
Figure 7 displays the result of four comparable surveys, the first conducted by the US 
Bureau of the Census, and the others by the City University New York. The 1957 survey 
was the only time the US Census has surveyed religion, which it afterwards decided was 
not constitutional for it to undertake. 
It can be seen that there has been a great growth in ›no religion‹ as a category in the 
USA. However, the extent of the growth is much less than in all the countries being sur-
veyed here other than Ireland and Northern Ireland. The figure for 1957 at 2.7 % is sig-
nificantly higher than for other countries at that date, suggesting strongly that the mode of 
enquiry (by telephone rather than by census enumeration) may have had an impact on the 
figures; however, it may indicate something more profoundly singular in the USA in the 
use of the term ›no religion‹.51 Moreover, we are unable to conclude from these data the 
significance of the 1960s, nor the precise course of development by decade. Despite this 
paucity of information, in reviewing the figures of 8.2 for 1990, 14.2 for 2001 and 15.0 
for 2008, the authors of the last three surveys have concluded that: »The 1990s was the 
decade when the ›secular boom‹ occurred – each year 1.3 million more adult Americans 
joined the ranks of the Nones. Since 2001 the annual increase has halved to 660,000 a 
year«.52 This does not necessarily conflict with suggesting that the 1960s may also have 
been an important decade, but it will require acquisition of other data. Notwithstanding 
this and the apparently relentless growth of ›no-religionists‹ in the USA, the country’s 
levels of ›no religion‹ are significantly behind Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, as 
we shall see, the UK. 
Figure 8: ›No Religion‹ in the UK by Country 2001: Proportion in Census53 
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—————— 
51 This is something adumbrated briefly by José Casanova, The Religious Situation in Europe, 
in: Hans Joas / Klaus Wiegandt (eds.), Secularization and the World Religions, Liverpool 2009, 
pp. 206–228, here: pp. 221 f. 
52 Kosmin / Keysar, The American Nones, p. 20. 
53 Sources: Scotland: Census 2001, Tables UV17 and KS07, URL: <http://www.gro-scotland.gov. 
uk> [25.11.2009]; England and Wales: Table KS07, URL: <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/Stat 
Base/ssdataset.asp?vlnk=6682&Pos=5&ColRank=1&Rank=240> [25.11.2009]. 
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UK Countries 
In the UK, the measurement of religion has not been an activity of the general census on 
the mainland until 2001. In Northern Ireland, it has been conducted for longer, for reasons 
of religious inequality measurement in a society sharply divided between Catholic and 
Protestant communities. The 2001 census results are shown in Figure 8. 
In Northern Ireland, the numbers of those categorising themselves at the census as of 
›no religion‹ have been tiny. In the 2001 census, in answering the question »Do you re-
gard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?«, 45,909 people, or only 2.7 %, 
were ticked as answering »no«. But of these, 30 % were born outside Northern Ireland, 
and 6.5 % were of Chinese ethnicity (when the latter only made up 0.32 % of the total popu-
lation). Furthermore, 17,325 of these were under 12 years of age (21,286 under 16) years; 
the proportion of those over 15 years answering »none« was only 1.91 %. Therefore, 
amongst native Northern Irish adults, levels of those identifying themselves as of ›no re-
ligion‹ might be estimated after such deductions at not much more than 1 %.54 What is ad-
ditionally remarkable is the minute number of specified ›no-religionists‹: In 2001, there 
were in Northern Ireland only 106 atheists, 66 agnostics, and 40 humanists.55 In such cir-
cumstances, of course, we must be led into identifying the category ›no religion‹ as having 
little salience in Northern Ireland. Religion is a badge of belonging in a heavily sectarian 
society, which virtually everybody carries in their daily lives. 
Turning to mainland UK, the proportion of ›no-religionists‹ is highest in Scotland, fol-
lowed by Wales and then England. There was a slight difference in possible answers 
permitted in England and Wales compared to other countries, but the figures do seem to 
reveal real differences. In particular the Church of England has retained some level of 
religious identification when Wales broadly has no established or ›national‹ church, and 
when the Church of Scotland (which has retained a notional ›national‹ identity) has clearly 
suffered a collapse in popular identification. The change to the religious identities of 
Wales and Scotland are very marked since the 1950s when they were regarded as bearing 
staunch Christian heritages and fairly puritanical legislation, in something of a contrast 
to what was then seen as the more ›secular‹ England.56 
As to the trends, the best estimate we have is from the British Social Attitude surveys 
shown in Figure 9 which demonstrate a steady growth of ›no-religionism‹ from 1983 
(when it stood at 31.6 % of adult population) and 2009 (50.7 %). Despite some sampling 
issues57, the long-term upward movement in ›no religion‹ seems to be clear, though these 
data do not allow us to readily date the origins of this trend in Britain. 
—————— 
54 Calculated from data in NISRA, Census 2001, Theme Tables: 1. Demography: People, Fami-
lies, Households, Table T35, URL: <http://www.nisranew.nisra.gov.uk/census/pdf/theme tables. 
pdf> [8.12.2009]. 
55 Data from NISRA, Census 2001, Table S308 Religion by Sex, URL: <http://www.nisranew. 
nisra.gov.uk/census/Census2001Output/standard_tables_ni.html#Demography> [8.12.2009]. 
56 John Highet, The Scottish Churches, London 1960, pp. 55–57. 
57 What is a little concerning in these data is the volatility of the score (from a c. 3,500 sample), 
which contrasts with much greater steadiness in another measure by the Scottish Household 
Survey (from a much larger sample of c. 12,000). 
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Figure 9: ›No Religion‹ in Britain 1983–2009: British Social Attitudes Surveys 
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Note: Proportion of people responding ›no religion‹ in annual face-to-face (and later computer-
assisted) interviews of around 3,500 people. The 2009 figure may be unweighted.58 
IV. WHO WERE ›NO-RELIGIONISTS‹? 
›No-religionists‹ show some important general characteristics. First, they have tended to 
be younger than the general population or the religionists; in Canada in 2001, almost 
40 % were aged under 25 years compared to 33 % of total population (with a median age 
of 31 years compared to 37 respectively); of all ›no-religionists‹, only 6.2 % were over 
64 years (compared to 12.2 % of total population), and whilst they were most over-re-
presented in the under 15 age group (as reported by parents and guardians in most cases), 
they were notably numerous in the 25–44 age group (35 % compared to 31 % of popula-
tion).59 Similarly, in England and Wales in 2001, 40.4 % of ›no-religionists‹ were under 
25 years, compared to 31.1 % of the general population, though they were even more nu-
merous in the 25–49 age group (44.3 % as compared with 35.3 % of population).60 It 
seems likely, though still to be investigated, that this balance in relative age has been fairly 
constant. 
But there have been some important changes to other characteristics of ›no-religionists‹. 
It has long been an accepted truism that migrants tend to be strong in their religious faith. 
—————— 
58 Sources: British Social Attitudes survey results given online at URL: <http://www.britsocat. 
com/BodySecure.aspx?control=BritsocatMarginals&var=RELIGION&SurveyID=221> [1.9. 
2010]; annotated questionnaire, 2009 survey, URL: <http://www.natcen.ac.uk/study/british-
social-attitudes-27th-report> [28.12.2010]. 
59 Statistics Canada, Religions in Canada: 2001 Census: Analysis Series, Ottawa 2003, pp. 9 and 
20. 
60 Calculated from data in T53, Theme Table on Religion, at URL: <http://www.statistics.gov. 
uk/census2001/cn_105_link.asp> [19.1.2011]. 
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However, research by Hugh McLeod for New York during 1870–1914 showed that ex-
perience varied considerably by ethnic group (though tended to be strongest amongst 
English-speaking migrants) and persisted for several generations, yet was no higher or 
lower overall than the native-born.61 However, research in Canada shows a changing vista 
on migrant religiosity. In 2001, immigrants who arrived before 1961 were overwhelmingly 
religious, with only 11 % of ›no religion‹; however this was way above the level of relig-
ion in the whole population as recorded in 1961, and might tend to question the reliabil-
ity of memory. In any event, this proportion rose steeply in successive waves of immigra-
tion – 13.5 % in 1961–1970, 16.5 % in 1971–1980, 17.3 % in 1981–1990, and 21.3 % in 
1991–1920.62 This is a trend linked strongly to the migration of people born in China 
(PRC), Hong Kong and Taiwan; 59 % of ethnic Chinese responded ›no religion‹.63 
In the United States, there was significant racial change to the ›no-religionists‹. In the 
1950s, some 3.5 % of non-whites were classified as ›no religion‹, but only 2.6 % of whites.64 
By 2001, the racial composition of ›no-religionists‹ had evidently changed. In the Ameri-
can Religious Identification Survey, 73 % were white, 8 % black, 5 % Asian, 11 % His-
panic, and 4 % of other ethnic identity.65 In this way, there was a ›whitening‹ of ›no re-
ligion‹ in the US in the second half of the century. 
Did this happen elsewhere? The ›whitening‹ of ›no religion‹ was only partially evident 
in the UK. In the 2001 census, in Scotland ›no religion‹ was markedly lower for non-
white groups: 2.8 % of Pakistanis, 23.1 % of blacks, though higher at 32 % of those self-
identifying as Caribbean and 63 % of Chinese. Moreover, 27 % of ›white Scots‹ described 
themselves as ›no religion‹, compared to 30.8 % of non-Scottish white people. In Eng-
land in 2001, only 0.5 % of Pakistanis described themselves as ›no religion‹.66 So Scottish 
ethnic minorities were significantly more prone to label themselves as non-religious than 
the equivalent groups in England, bearing out perhaps the view of other commentators 
that religiosity, and notably fundamentalism, was markedly lower in Scotland than in 
England. 
One of the striking characteristics of the rise of ›no-religionism‹ between the 1950s and 
the 2000s in every country studied is the gender change. In the middle decades of the 
twentieth century in every nation, the ›no-religionists‹ were overwhelmingly male. The 
proportion female was only 31 % in Canada in 1951, 26.2 % in the USA in 1958, 36 % in 
Ireland in 1960, and 42 % in Australia in 1976. By the 2000s, the proportions were almost 
even – ranging from 45 to 47 % in each nation (including the UK countries), but were still 
significantly lower in the USA (39 %). To proclaim oneself of ›no religion‹ in the mid-
twentieth-century was, for a woman much more than for a man, to court a loss of social 
respectability. So, increasing gender equality in ›no religion‹ has been becoming apparent. 
Economic sources of ›no-religionism‹ can be sought through statistical correlations. In 
the American Religious Identity Survey of 2001, levels of ›no religion‹ varied between a 
high of 25 % in Washington State and a low of 3 % in North Dakota. Looking for rela-
tionships, economic factors were poor variables. Correlating states’ levels of ›no religion‹ 
with personal income level produced a correlation coefficient of +0.2338, which was a 
poor relationship, but one suggesting that levels of ›no religion‹ rose with mean income 
level. In a second correlation of religious adherence with percentage of the population of 
—————— 
61 McLeod, Piety and Poverty, pp. 53–56. 
62 Statistics Canada, Religions in Canada: 2001 Census: Analysis Series, pp. 9 and 19. 
63 Brian Clarke / Stuart Macdonald, Simply ›Christian‹: Canada’s Newest Major Religious De-
nomination, in: Toronto Journal of Theology 23, 2007, pp. 109–125, here: p. 115. 
64 Calculated from data in Current Population Report, Series P-20-079 (1957), cited in Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 1968, Population, table 49, p. 41. 
65 Kosmin / Mayer / Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey, Exhibit 13, p. 35. 
66 Brown, Religion and Society, p. 7. 
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each state below the poverty level, a correlation coefficient of –0.2240 was obtained – 
again a poor relationship, but one suggesting that as level of ›no religion‹ rose the poverty 
level fell. Though each of these economic factors had poor relationships with levels of 
›no religion‹, they were consistent in indicating that levels of ›no religion‹ tended to rise 
as prosperity rose.67 
The level of ›no religion‹ in Northern Ireland has been extremely low – less than 3 % 
in 2001 and less than that for previous decades. Notwithstanding this, amongst the 25 
local government districts of Northern Ireland, there was a strong negative correlation 
between level of ›no religion‹ and level of Catholic upbringing (a correlation coefficient 
of –0.8409); conversely, there was a strong positive correlation with level of Protestant 
upbringing (a coefficient of +0.8135).68 This would indicate that the development of ›no 
religion‹ identity – tiny as it is – has been very much stronger in Protestant communities 
than in Catholic ones. This is something that applies more broadly. In examining the loss 
of religion since childhood down to 1998, Andrew Greeley noted the wide variations in 
the loss rate between countries – high losses in former East Germany (46 %), Netherlands 
(43 %), Britain (33 %), and France (both 31 %), but a negative loss (i. e. religious gain) in 
Russia (–40 %), against a European average of 15 %. But at the same time, he noted that 
that greatest loss was to those from Protestant backgrounds (a European average of 21 %) 
compared to Catholic (15 %), Islam (13 %) and Orthodox Christian (5 %).69 
In this way, different nations show in some regards different civic, cultural and reli-
gious backgrounds to the rise of ›no religion‹. This article has focussed on the major 
English-speaking nations, but has demonstrated that these do seem to form neither a uni-
form experience, nor a distinctive experience from that of continental Europe. Yet, a 
number of generalising conclusions are possible. One, the level of ›no religion‹ was re-
markably similar in all measured countries between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
centuries (to the 1950s), and the level throughout this period was very low (with the pos-
sible exception of the USA, at under 1 %). Two, where the data can show this, there is 
evidence of a decline in ›no religion‹ between the early and mid-twentieth centuries, sug-
gesting no gradualist growth in this category but, on the contrary, a rising cultural pres-
sure to eschew it. Three, in all the countries for which the data can show this, the 1960s 
marked a turning point, with dramatic rates of growth of ›no-religionism‹ which, though 
they later declined, remained at a high rate for successive decades down to the 2000s. 
Four, the level of ›no religion‹ that emerged was broadly similar in Canada, mainland 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand, but much lower in Ireland, Northern Ireland and the 
United States. Five, relying on non-census data, the level of ›no religion‹ across Europe 
appears to have diverged markedly by the 1990s, though the trends were generally simi-
lar and in a strongly secularising direction. Six, ›no religion‹ grew strongest (or perhaps 
earliest) amongst Protestant rather than Catholic or other religious communities. Seven, 
the gender change between the 1950s and 2000s is a common denominator everywhere 
as far as the data stretch; from being a strongly masculine trait, ›no religion‹ emerged by 
the early twenty-first century as almost equal between men and women. 
—————— 
67 The ›no religion‹ data for the correlations was obtained from Kosmin / Mayer / Keysar, American 
Religious Identification Survey, Exhibit 15, pp. 39–42. The data for personal income per capita 
in 2000 (current dollars) for each state came from Statistical Abstract of the United States 
2001, Table 652, p. 426; the data for proportion of population in each state below the poverty 
level came from Statistical Abstract of the United States 2002, Table 673, p. 443, both online 
at URL: <http://www.census.gov> [19.11.2009]. 
68 These correlations were conducted on the data in community background (religion or religion 
brought up in), from Census, April 2001, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 
URL: <http://www.statistics.gov.uk> [25.11.2009]. 
69 Figures from and calculated from Greeley, Religion in Europe, pp. 56 and 58. 
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V. RE-CONCEIVING SECULARISATION IN TERMS OF THE RISE OF THE PEOPLE OF 
›NO RELIGION‹ 
In the data reviewed in this article, we have the basis for establishing a narrative of the 
modern history of people of ›no religion‹. The demographic contours begin to emerge of 
this vast category of the population that was formed in the Europeanised world by the 
early twenty-first century. 
There still remain issues to be explored concerning causation. At the root of this must 
surely rest the evidence of the timing of change. If we look at secularisation as a growth 
of people of ›no religion‹, we must conceive of this as a process in which the freedoms 
to not attend or affiliate with a church, and to express non-belief, is one related to wider 
social changes. In this regard, it is surely no coincidence that the changes started in the 
1960s, and, where the data permit greater detail, to the later 1960s.70 At the same time, it 
can be no surprise that the change was also one in which there is a significant growth of 
non-adherence and expression of ›no religion‹ by women. 
The significance of the 1960s to secularisation and religious change in Britain and other 
nations is now more widely appreciated.71 It was a decade of enormous cultural change 
in which the hegemony of discursive Christianity underwent widespread collapse. Parts 
of that cultural transformation placed women as central figures, and from many perspec-
tives key agents. A review of social surveys conducted in Britain between 1951 and 1973 
showed that single women exhibited a critical linked change to both their religious and 
sexual behaviour in the early and mid-1960s – occurring before the arrival of the contra-
ceptive pill for this group, demonstrating that those women with the greatest sexual ad-
venturousness displayed the greatest decline in religiosity.72 Studies of autobiographical 
evidence show a strong element of religious alienation growing in the late 1950s and early 
1960s amongst those teenage girls who became, from 1964 and 1965, the backbone of 
the British feminist movement; some of these have gone on to be strong supporters of 
organised humanist and atheist groups.73 
In this way, there is an argument for viewing secularisation as in part the growth of a 
positive ideology of ›no-religionism‹, linked to feminism and to other forms of radicalism 
which flowered in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet, this link is not the only explanation. The 
vast bulk of ›no-religionists‹ attained that status not through commitment but through 
various degrees of apathy, producing a practical agnosticism rather than a ›speculative 
atheism‹ (or thinking non-belief in a god). Yet, it is important to acknowledge that a per-
son’s drift from a religion within a religious society, however explained as apathy, was 
also an act or journey of adventurous rejection – involving neglect of family values (fre-
quently involving revolt against parents), dismissal of school compulsion, and a counter-
cultural revolt. For women, this journey was especially difficult given the expectations 
that religion braced the respectable woman. It is in the midst of this, often difficult, pas-
—————— 
70 The importance of this half decade is emphasised in McLeod, Religious Crisis, pp. 141–160. 
71 Notably ibid.; Brown, Death of Christian Britain; Patrick Pasture, Christendom and the Legacy 
of the Sixties. Between the Secular City and the Age of Aquarius, in: Review d’Histoire Ecclé-
siastique 99, 2004, pp. 82–117. 
72 Callum G. Brown, Sex, Religion and the Single Woman c. 1950–1975. The Importance of a 
›Short‹ Sexual Revolution to the English Religious Crisis of the Sixties, in: Twentieth Century 
British History 22, 2011, pp. 189–215, online at URL: <http://tcbh.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 
early/2010/11/30/tcbh.hwq048.full.pdf> [25.6.2011]. 
73 Callum G. Brown, Women and Religion in Britain. The Autobiographical View of the Fifties 
and Sixties, in: Brown / Snape, Secularisation in the Christian World, pp. 159–173; idem, Gen-
dering Secularisation: Locating Women in the Transformation of British Christianity in the 
1960s, in: Gareth Stedman Jones / Ira Katznelson (eds.), Religion and the Political Imagination, 
Cambridge 2010, pp. 275–294. 
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sive form of secularisation that the development of an ideology of ›no-religionism‹ 
broached the possibility of it being a respectable position for women; without the ideology 
starting to pervade the cultural milieu from the 1960s, the passive female ›no-religionist‹ 
could have found that the family and community pressure made her transit from religion 
personally difficult. Oral history research can do much to reveal the remoulding of the 
female religious self within humanism and atheism that occurred between the 1960s and 
the 1980s, often in fraught family and community circumstances.74 In this sense, in Britain 
and other countries, there were between the 1960s and 2000s underlying moral drivers to 
growing humanism, atheism and agnosticism – drivers including feminism, toleration for 
sexualities, euthanasia and assisted suicide, and anti-racism. Whilst recognising that in 
some countries (like the USA and Canada) there was greater divergence amongst ›no-
religionists‹ in their moral positions, it seems highly likely that the British experience 
was replicable elsewhere. 
The difficulty that a woman had in the 1950s to proclaim herself an atheist has largely 
disappeared in most nations under review. This decline is most marked in Western Europe, 
including mainland Britain, but least strong in the United States where the moral distrust 
of atheists is reported by sociologists as having grown stronger, whilst distrust of other 
minorities (including gays, racial and religious minorities, and even Muslims post 9 / 11) 
has diminished.75 Part, perhaps a major part, of the explanation here may lie in the fact, 
previously noted, that the USA of all the nations studied in the 2000s exhibited the 
weakest female identification with ›no religion‹; it was still a place, perhaps like Britain 
in the 1950s, where a girl could be taunted as a »heathen«. Though it would be misleading 
to equate atheism directly with ›no-religionism‹, this does serve to show that the cultural 
demonisation of ›no-religionism‹ has waned faster in the greater Europe (including Aus-
tralasia and Canada) to the point by the 2000s that this outlook is a viewpoint character-
istic of a religious minority. The people of ›no religion‹ have emerged as the imminent 
majority in the bulk of the English-speaking world, as they are of most European na-
tions. They may not all be atheists, but they constitute the major cultural category in 
these parts. There is still much to be done in tracing their history. 
—————— 
74 This is a project I am currently undertaking in Britain, Ireland, Canada and the United States. 
See URL: <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/history/humanism> [25.6.2011]. 
75 Edgell / Gerteis / Hartmann, Atheists as ›Other‹. 
  
